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Recommendations
\ No deportations or repatriation pro-
grammes from Germany, the EU, Iran 
and Pakistan without a guarantee of 
sustainably secure living conditions  
Administrative authorities in the German states should 
only carry out deportations of Afghans if they can 
guarantee the safety of the deportees in the long term 
and enable sustainably humane living conditions. 
Germany needs an immigration law 
that is also beneficial to people from 
Afghanistan.
An immigration law would regulate legal access to 
the German jobs and educational/training markets 
for qualified people and skilled workers from abroad, 
including from Afghanistan, and rule out the immigra-
tion of ineligible people.
Extend vocational training and em-
ployment schemes to areas which are 
not under full control of the Afghan 
government
Training and employment schemes should be im-
plemented in areas that are under the control of the 
government as well as outside of these areas through 
collaboration with locally elected community develop-
ment councils, guilds and professional associations.
\ Take the initiative for Afghanistan in the 
Global Compact for Migration: For labour 
market policy measures and simplified 
money transfers 
Since February this year, the intergovernmental 
negotiation process on developing the Global Com-
pact for Migration has been taking place in New York. 
The German government should (1) advocate for the 
National Labour Migration Strategy and the National 
Labour Policy of the Government of Afghanistan to be 
taken into account. It should (2) support a reduction in 
transfer fees for remittances sent by Afghan migrants, 
as suggested by the KfW. 
\ Enshrine the rights of internally dis-
placed people and refugees in regional 
host countries in the Global Compact on 
Refugees 
The government should work towards ensuring that 
internally displaced people in Afghanistan and refugees 
in the regional host countries, Iran and Pakistan, receive 
the right to education, land and housing, medical care 
and effective legal protection as a matter of principle.  
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The German government bears respon-
sibility for the sustainable livelihood 
security of Afghan men and women 
Germany’s participation in the military and civil  
intervention in Afghanistan following 2001 played a 
major role in the reconstruction and improved access 
to basic social services for the population in compari-
son to the 1990s. However, it became clear that the 
economically, socially and politically destructive  
effects of a decade-long war could not be repaired in 
just a few years. One important internal challenge for 
the increasingly divided government continues to be 
stemming corruption.1 In addition, due to the poor 
economic environment and the inability of the Afghan 
government to distribute the country’s meagre wealth 
equitably, even now the option of joining armed groups 
still appeals to many Afghans. This is prolonging the 
violent conflict. The withdrawal of more than 100,000 
NATO soldiers between 2012 and 2014 has further  
exacerbated the precarious situation of the Afghan 
government. Since then, not only have unemployment 
and underemployment increased, so too have attacks 
by militants and the loss of control of the Afghan  
government. While the Afghan government still con-
trolled 72 per cent of the districts in 2015, this figure 
had fallen to 56 per cent in 2017. In January 2018,  
Taliban groups were active in 70 per cent of Afghan 
districts.2  
The reasons for the deterioration of the security situ-
ation are not all of a domestic political nature. It is 
also caused by tensions in the region surrounding  
Afghanistan. Due to the interaction of internal and 
external factors, the government was unable to con-
solidate initial welfare gains.3  As a result, Afghani-
stan is still a long way away from developing its  
 
 
1 \  In 2017, Afghanistan was once again classified as one of the five most 
corrupt countries in the world (cf. Trading Economics, 2018, https://
tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/corruption-rank).
2 \  Cf. results of recent investigative research by the BBC, published on 31 
January 2018: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42863116
3 \  The annual gross domestic product per capita decreased from US $680 
to US $580 between 2012 and 2016 (cf. World Bank, 2018, https://data.
worldbank.org/country/afghanistan). For an overview of the regional 
situation see Harpviken and Tadjbakhsh, 2016.
economy and implementing peaceful conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms. The German government is, there-
fore, continuing its participation in the advisory and 
training mission of NATO’s Operation Resolute Sup-
port and is supporting the Afghan government in its 
efforts to regain control. Additionally, offers through 
German and international aid and development  
organizations of alternative civil opportunities for  
Afghans to earn money can make a promising contri-
bution to reducing violence. 
The deteriorating living conditions and insecurity in 
Afghanistan have led to a renewed increase in the 
number of refugees. The German government, and 
many Germans, do not view the acceptance of a higher 
number of people from Afghanistan to Germany as 
being desirable. Around five million Afghans have 
taken refuge in Afghanistan’s neighbouring states, 
Iran and Pakistan, since the end of the 1970s. Today, 
both countries are rightly demanding that the burden 
be shared. The German government should, therefore, 
consider new possibilities for supporting Iran and 
Pakistan so that they can integrate Afghans instead 
of deporting them to the insecure environment in  
Afghanistan. It should aim to prevent further dis-
placement and put the regional host countries in a 
position to allow Afghan people to sustainably secure 
their livelihood there. This is in Germany’s interests, 
as a mass deportation from the neighbouring coun-
tries under the current conditions would encourage 
violence and further extend the necessity for an in-
ternational presence. 
The transnational Afghan networks
Over the past few decades, Afghans have established 
social networks which encompass villages and towns 
in Afghanistan as well as other places around the 
world. The splitting up of households and a high level 
of mobility are a way for them to secure their liveli-
hood in the long run despite the ongoing violence in 
their home country. To spread the risk, they often 
move within the country, or emigrate, return and 
then emigrate again as part of a circular migration 
movement or flight. Over time, Afghan families have 
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thus formed transnational networks based on kin-
ship, within which the distinction between migrants 
and refugees becomes blurred (Schetter, 2012). 
The research we carried out from 2015 to 2017 (Grawert 
& Mielke, 2018) confirms the importance of transna-
tional networks as a "safety valve” and a component 
of social resilience for a large number of Afghan fami-
lies. The transnational networks use remittances to 
secure the living conditions of their families, to fi-
nance rebuilding efforts and to enable threatened 
and displaced relatives to flee. The formation of Afghan 
networks is partially strategic. In Iran, it is more 
about getting access to better-paid jobs. In Pakistan, 
besides gaining access to employment, until recently 
it was also about receiving humanitarian aid. The 
“nodes” in transnational networks are the Afghans 
who live in Iran, in Pakistan, in Afghanistan and other 
countries, who take in new arrivals, integrate them 
into the host community or enable them to move on. 
The infrastructure of the transnational networks 
consists of, among other things, financial flows  
(hawala transfers)4, assistance in finding educational 
and employment opportunities, connections to traf-
fickers and the exchange of information and experi-
ences (Monsutti, 2008). In transnational spaces,  
Afghans integrate as groups made up of changing in-
dividuals. They adapt flexibly to situations according 
to context and repeatedly change their position fol-
lowing new displacements that push them in different 
directions. Thus, Afghan living conditions are charac-
terized by multidimensional embeddedness (Houte, 
Siegel, & Davids, 2014). For decades, they have been 
filling special niches in the labour markets of neigh-
bouring countries as well as in the Gulf States and 
some European countries. Iran’s experiences in the 
wake of its “open door policy” between 1979 and 1989 
suggest that legal recognition and the granting of 
residence permits opens up employment opportuni-
ties for the immigrants in niche job markets as well 
as opening up sources of taxation for the state. 
 
 
4 \  Trust-based, undocumented, mechanisms for transferring money, 
which have a global reach.
The refusal of some states to assign the residence of 
Afghans a legal status will not prevent the latter from 
immigrating and attempting to make a living, in any 
circumstances, including through irregular work.
Transnational networks as a “durable solution”  
For almost twenty years, the United Nations Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) has concentrated on three durable 
solutions to protracted displacement situations5: repa-
triation (voluntary return), local integration in neigh-
bouring countries or resettlement in a third country. 
These approaches ignore largely the agency of Afghans 
towards securing their livelihood in a range of different 
environments and in particular, through the active 
forging of transnational networks.6  The three durable 
solutions also ignore the fact that protracted displace-
ment situations create conditions in which, following 
the first generation of displaced people, several subse-
quent generations of the family will anchor their lives 
abroad and are de facto integrated in a “host context”. 
This is the case, for example, for many Afghan people 
in Pakistan and in Iran.
The complex conflict-related causes for constrained 
livelihood options in Afghanistan lead to “mixed  
migration”. This means that not every Afghan emigrant 
applies for asylum; some live as undocumented  
migrants in Iran and Pakistan while others use legal 
possibilities to take on work and educational opportu-
nities abroad. The complexity of protracted displace-
ment situations requires that the individual decision 
to leave his or her country must be accepted as long as 
violent conflict continues. That is precisely why  
policies are required that go beyond only protecting 
those Afghans who have had direct experiences of vio-
lence, persecution and threats to their lives. 
5 \  The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) defines situations in 
which more than 25,000 people have been forced to flee to a neigh-
bouring country for a period of at least five years, without any pros-
pects of a solution, as protracted refugee situations. These situations 
are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty; basic rights and 
needs are not fulfilled for years. Often, these situations imply a pro-
tracted dependency on external support.
6 \  The term livelihood is used here in the broad sense of sustaining a 
way of life according to the measure of certain groups; it includes all 
activities carried out to safeguard and sustainably secure the living 
conditions, based on the interpretation of the group itself, which is 
pursuing these activities in the specific case. Cf. Grawert & Mielke, 2018.
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Consequences for German development 
cooperation: New approaches to sup-
porting transnational Afghan networks 
If transnational networks are recognized as an im-
portant element where Afghans’ agency manifests, 
i.e. for galvanizing self-generated initiatives and self-
help among Afghans, a series of policy recommenda-
tions for the amendment of migration and refugee 
policies emerge: 
   \ A ground-breaking step towards a migration 
and refugee policy for Afghans which encour-
ages networks would be the support of the  
Afghan government in the initiation and con-
clusion of regional labour migration agreements. 
Afghanistan’s National Labour Migration Strat-
egy and the Afghan government’s Labour Market 
Policy framework should become part of the 
Global Compact for Migration. Due to structural 
limitations, the Afghan government is, in the 
medium term, not in a position to offer its citi-
zens employment and education to the extent 
required. There are both natural geographic 
and political economic reasons for this, such as 
small agricultural areas, very little industriali-
zation, a small services sector, an economy 
which is in deficit and a state budget that is  
dependent on external financing and remit-
tances from migrants. To help the Afghan gov-
ernment to benefit from the potential of remit-
tances, the legal and coordinated export of 
labour to countries in the region—for example 
the Arab Gulf States, Russia and neighbouring 
Pakistan, Iran as well as central Asian countries—
must be facilitated. This would also reduce the 
socio-economic pressure on the Afghan job 
market and create an effective exit valve for 
underemployment and unemployment. In  
addition to international contracts and frame-
work agreements, it would require the educa-
tion and training of Afghans to acquire skills 
that would allow them to compete with work-
ers from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan in the 
labour markets of the Gulf States. 
The typical strategy of humanitarian organizations, 
however, separates people in need into different cate-
gories and target groups depending on the context—
internally displaced persons, returnees, deportees, local 
host communities, refugees in the regional neighbour- 
hood, host communities in the region, refugees in Eu-
rope, and so on, without this increasing the chances 
to generate sustainable livelihood. The sharp distinc-
tions conceal the interactions of displaced persons 
spread across and beyond these groups, and obscure 
the transnational agency of displaced Afghans.
The conventional approaches of the United Nations, 
and of international refugee policies, are not flexible 
enough to account for the livelihood realities of Afghans. 
We, therefore, call for the political and practical sup-
port offered by their transnational networks to be  
recognized as a further durable solution. Governments, 
for their part, should recognize transnational networks 
as relevant redistribution mechanisms that serve the 
needs of family members left behind at home and 
support existing self-help efforts. Government, human- 
itarian, and development actors could then employ 
these self-initiated social infrastructures to facilitate 
education, medical care, employment and the integra-
tion of those who move between the different network 
nodes. As refugees and migrants are very committed 
to supporting family members who have remained in 
their home countries, the simplification of interna-
tional transfers of money and goods can usefully com-
plement humanitarian and development aid within 
Afghanistan. 
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can obtain legal access to education, training 
and the German jobs market. By doing so, legal 
access to the German labour and education/
training markets for qualified and skilled people 
from abroad, including from Afghanistan, will 
be regulated, and the immigration of unautho- 
rized people will be excluded. Afghan men and 
women could then provide financial support to 
their families in Afghanistan, removing the 
need for these family members to emigrate. 
   \ In line with the logic of supporting transna-
tional networks, the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) could expand its mandate to promote 
sustainable development to include support of 
Afghans in Germany by offering scholarships, 
language courses and limited-time social assis-
tance during a temporary residence in Germany 
for skills-training and professional development. 
A legally regulated and coordinated admission 
of applicants from abroad—including Afghans—
to training, further education and university 
programmes could have the aim of promoting 
qualified employment in under-staffed areas 
on the German and European labour markets. 
As a side effect, this type of policy could con-
tribute to creating a “Germanophile” elite. 
Young Afghans with this type of background 
could help to constructively shape future rela-
tionships between Afghanistan and Germany 
from within Afghan society. 
   \ Protracted displacement situations are empiri-
cally closely linked to phenomena of exclusion. 
Marginalization is reinforced by inferiority 
such as is attributed to internally displaced 
people and refugees externally as well as by 
those affected themselves. Besides working to-
wards non-discriminate access to land, public 
services, political representation and participa-
tion which is independent of status, contribu-
tors such as the BMZ and the Federal Foreign 
Office should avoid categorizations such as in-
ternally displaced people, refugees, 
   \ At the same time, in the Global Compact for 
Migration discussions, the German government 
should insist on enshrining legal access to edu-
cation, training/apprenticeships or employment 
for refugees and migrants. Those who are suc-
cessful will thus be put in a position to support 
their families in Afghanistan or abroad through 
remittances. The control of remittances should 
also be fostered by means of the KfW giving its 
pilot project in collaboration with the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank a more 
permanent status and expanding support of 
low transfer charges for Afghan migrants’ cash 
remittances. The German government should 
support this by pushing for a reduction in 
transfer charges in the negotiations for the 
Global Compact for Migration.  
   \ In the consultations on the Global Compact on 
Refugees, the German government should aim 
to achieve, as a matter of principle, non-dis-
criminate access to education, effective legal 
protection, the right to land and housing and 
medical care for displaced Afghans in Afghani-
stan, Iran and Pakistan. In the interest of pro-
tection, the administrative authorities in the 
German federal states may then only carry out 
deportations if they guarantee the deportees 
long-term security and sustainable livelihood 
options. This includes not only the self-suffi-
ciency of repatriated Afghans but also that of 
their families in Afghanistan. GIZ (Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) should 
promote the reintegration of the returnees 
from Germany, Iran and Pakistan by creating 
effective medium-term income opportunities. 
   \ The analysis of transnational networks shows 
that due to mixed migration, it is rare for entire 
families to emigrate abroad for good but that 
Afghans also do not want to leave their host 
country behind entirely. The German govern-
ment should pass a national immigration law 
which defines under which conditions and 
with which qualifications potential migrants 
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undocumented migrants, deportees, etc. in 
their funding lines, and instead strive to achieve 
an integrated support for communities. Those 
affected by conflict will benefit more from this. 
Programmes supporting host communities 
could respond more flexibly to the challenges 
in the context of hosting than special aid pro-
grammes for narrowly defined target groups 
that automatically exclude others. 
   \ Given that the control and influence of the  
Afghan government at a local level is decreas-
ing, German implementing organizations such 
as GIZ should involve local guilds, professional 
associations and commercial representatives 
in their programmes. These organizations can 
provide access to communities located in the 
areas which are beyond the control of the state 
security bodies, and they can help provide local 
employment. Training, further education and 
employment programmes should not exclude 
the people living there but should create voca-
tional training and sector-specific employment 
in accordance with the needs of the local Afghan 
labour market. The BMZ should encourage local 
implementing organizations to work closely 
with locally elected community development 
councils in areas under the control of the gov-
ernment as well as outside of these areas.
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